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Abstract
A model of corruption in the production process is built which is aimed at
studying the problem of choosing the optimal scheme of punishment, tak-
ing into account the structure of given production relations, as well as the
xed budget assumption. Stable equilibria of the model are characterized,
and the mechanism of a bureaucrat's decision-making process is described.
The crucial role of strategic interactions among bureaucrats is emphasized.
Then, the model is used to examine punishment schemes: to what degree
should punishment schemes depend on the deviation from the average level
of corruption by a given agent. Normally, it is better for a policymaker to
have a scheme which reacts sharply to the deviations.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper is devoted to the analysis of corrupt relations in the economy.
My aim is to adequately characterize such relations by specifying the role of
alternative factors of corruption and their interactions, as well as to study the
impact of alternative anti-corruption measures on the average level of cor-
ruption in the economy. A particularly interesting question is the eciency
of one special measure, namely, the redistribution of resources devoted to
ghting corruption from highly corrupt agents to moderately corrupt ones or
vice versa.
In order to achieve these goals, an economic model is constructed and
studied. The main assumptions of the model are:
 a suciently large number of agents (bureaucrats);
 a monopoly position of any bureaucrat in providing illegal services to
a number of rms under his jurisdiction;
 the level of illegal activity, which is the degree of a bureaucrat's in-
volvement in corruption can take any real value;
 the presence of a central authority whose goal is to reduce the average
level of corruption as much as possible; this authority possesses a certain
budget and is free to choose one or another scheme of punishment out of an
exogenous set of such schemes.
Bureaucrats make their decisions about how much to involve themselves
in corruption by comparing their private benets from doing so with the costs.
Benets are higher when the degree of involvement is higher, but costs also
rise. This cost-benet trade-o is of a rather complex nature because of the
existence of mutually re-enforcing inuences among bureaucrats: costs are
lower when the overall level of corruption goes up because the earmarked
budget for ghting corruption is scarce. This is a crucial point of the pa-
per. We analyze the nature of this trade-o by assuming that costs of being
corrupt depend on two variables: the individual level of involvement, and
the average level corruption. The central authority can aect to a certain
degree the reciprocal inuences among bureaucrats through redistributing its
available budget. This redistribution determines how private costs of being
corrupt depend on the overall level of corruption.
This model provides the following insights:
 Society can nd itself in two long-lasting states. The rst one is
corruption-free, and the second one is characterized by a high average level
of corruption. This study is mainly concerned with the second type of equi-
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librium.
 The eects of a particular policy decision are accumulating in time.
In other words, the long-run consequences of a change in policy are stronger
than the short-run ones, and their direction is the same.
As for the main question of the paper | How do mutual inuences be-
tween bureaucrats aect the level of corruption? | requires distinguishing
between the following two cases:
(1) When there are no xed costs of corruption, the dierentiation in
bureaucrats' choices rises if costs weakly depend on the overall level; probably
the average corruption level increases as well.
(2) When xed costs are present, the weaker dependence of costs on the
average level of corruption results in all the corrupted bureaucrats increasing
their levels of involvement. Otherwise, they simply refrain from corruption
at all; in addition, either the dierentiation in agents' choices, or the average
level of corruption increases (maybe even both of them).
The main conclusion of the paper is that reducing the role of reciprocal
inuence among bureaucrats is likely to result in a rise in the average level
of corruption. Hence, such a policy may not be desirable. A by-product of
reducing reciprocal inuences is a higher dierentiation in individual corrup-
tion levels.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Corruption today: an overview
The problem of corruption is denitely one of the most pronounced in the cur-
rent world. Many countries (e.g., Zaire, Kenga, Nigeria, some other African
states, and probably also India, Indonesia (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993))
have a corruption level so high that losses are comparable to their GDP (this
is also mentioned in Satarov, Levine and Tsirik (1998), Bardhan (1997)).
Most peoples in Africa, Latin America and East Asia live at about the sur-
vival level, and most scientists agree that total corruption is one of the pri-
mary reasons for that (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Satarov, Levine and
Tsirik (1998), Rose{Ackerman (1978), as well as many other investigations).
In recent years some countries in transition joined this cohort of corrupt
states, and Russia is undoubtedly among the leaders, if not the very rst
one. According to Satarov, Levine and Tsirik (1998), losses from corruption
in Russia are high enough to justify any thinkable expenditure to ght it.
At the same time, one would probably suggest that in a centrally planned
economy, corruption may bring some benets. Alternative studies conrm
this view, e.g., Ericson (1983) convinces readers that corruption is necessary
(as a part of a general shadow economy) to facilitate a fairly well-functioning
planned economy, such as the former Soviet one. In fact, the presence of
corruption is a Pareto-improvement over an imaginary pure-planned regime
by making it possible for enterprises to fulll the plan, at the same time
making other agents wealthier. Still, such a system is always far from being
Pareto-optimal. Also, it is argued by Basu and Li (1998) that corruption
plays a special role in transition economies, rather positive than negative,
for it precedes economic growth (or even co-exists with it). But the authors
were studying China, and we know that China is rather an exception among
countries in transition, with respect to many parameters. As for standard
transition economies, as well as for economies of the Third World, corruption
has become a stable, persuasive and negative part of the public sector. For
example, Wei (1997) conducts an empirical analysis of the impact corruption
has on the propensity to invest; that is, how outside investors respond to cor-
ruption. Not only is the eect negative, but its magnitude is impressive. As
a matter of fact, corruption suppresses outside investment, hence, economic
growth as well.
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On the whole, one can suggest that corruption could play a somewhat
positive role in planned economies (like the former USSR), and to a certain
degree in highly controlled transition economies (China), at the same time
being an obstacle to economic prosperity in liberalized economies of a devel-
oping type such as those of the Third World and most of transition countries
(e.g., today's Russia).
Things are even more complicated, however. It is insucient simply to
allocate a certain amount of resources to ghting corruption. One should
rationally use these resources provided it is possible. Indeed, the history
of corruption extends for thousands of years, and the attitude towards cor-
ruption was not always and everywhere as tolerant as in pre-revolutionary
Russia (as for Russia, this is a distinct case, according to the classic lit-
erature, such as Gogol's Revisor, Ostrovsky's Dokhodnoe Mesto, and many
others). At the same time, it would be incorrect to say that entirely all eorts
to ghting corruption were bound to fail. Corruption is almost suppressed
in many European countries; it is held within admissible limits in the USA
and Singapore. However, historic conditions seem to play an important role
and, for instance, the absence of corruption in Denmark and Singapore is
due to quite dierent reasons (for example, in Singapure theft in the public
sector is punishable by death). Therefore, the primary question is whether
one could cope with corruption (or even suppress it entirely) using policy
and punishment schemes not involving a dragon's measures,
1
in a country
where corruption has become persuasive and stable enough.
1.2 Factors of corruption
A policy towards corruption should come from a deep understanding of its
concrete form and characteristics, including the magnitude of losses resulting
from corruption, mechanisms guaranteing its stability, and the environment
which might be prolic for corrupt relations of the sort considered. Leaving
aside the dicult and controversial question of losses from corruption, we will
call factors of corruption everything that inuences the level of corruption in
a society, including stability of corruption equilibria, and so on.
Polterovich (1998) suggested the following classication of factors of cor-
ruption (this classication will be adopted, to some extent, in what follows).
1
This is a famous Russian idiom meaning very cruel policy.
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Factors of corruption are called fundamental if they arise from an imperfect
environment; organizational if we mean a weak government; and societal if
we refer to the strategic interaction between bureaucrats. One can go fur-
ther and note that the rst two types of factors are external in that they
are considered as exogenous parameters to our system and have to do with
the current economic situation, whereas factors of the third type could be
called internal: they are determined endogenously in the system and usually
make an existing equilibrium stable. We simply will call fundamental all the
factors linked to the environment, and by societal we refer to the remaining
ones. The terms external and internal, respectively, are equivalent to the
two introduced above. As long as internal factors inuence the interactions
among bureaucrats, their appearance and work reveal externalities among
the agents in the system under consideration.
Despite the huge variety of corrupt relations, almost every such kind is
characterized by both external and internal factors. At the same time, there
is a lack of models that take into account both types of factors in the current
economic literature on corruption. Most of the existing papers appeal to fac-
tors either of external, or of internal nature (with the remarkable exception
of Acemoglu and Verdier (1997)). This creates a number of problems, for
such models usually do not reect the complexity of real mechanisms under-
lying corruption in a given situation. As a result, one is bound to form an
inadequate picture of what is really going on, which has undesirable conse-
quences. On the basis of such models, it is dangerous to construct policy
recommendations, as well as to simply make denite inferences.
2
1.3 A fundamental factor
In the current paper the author intends to take into account external factors
when determining the eect of internal ones, so to speak. To be more precise,
2
Even when a given aspect of corrupt relations is under study, it is wise to take into
account other aspects. As a matter of fact, as long as the corruption phenomenon is
under study, a general idea of abstracting out from the real life picture in order to better
illuminate features of current interest is not protable, because factors of dierent nature,
when determining the equilibrium level of corruption, interact more closely than someone
would have suggested.
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although the main subject of this work are externalities among bureaucrats
(representing an internal factor of corruption) and their role in determining
the equilibrium level of corruption, the model which is constructed for that
matter is based on the production side of the economy. Namely, bureau-
crats are assumed to take bribes from rms, hence, I study corruption in
production process. I will analyse the impact of production functions on the
corruption possibilities of bureaucrats, investigate mechanisms of deciding to
become involved in corruption and choices regarding the amounts of bribes
collected, and conduct a comparative statics relevant within the chosen ap-
proach. In addition, the production environment and relations will guarantee
the existance of equilibria, which is crucial for justifying ongoing research.
To be more concrete about the production process (and its role in char-
acterizing corruption possibilities as well), let us now describe a number of
special cases of corruption in the production environment.
Producers consider corruption to be one of the most ecient strategies
in a rent-seeking war where rent emerges from various articial barriers. As
for bureaucrats, corruption is an obvious and straightforward way to become
richer. It is not a surprise, therefore, that illegal mutually protable collusion
called a corrupt act is a widespread phenomenon. Let us now characterize
several types of such collusions.
1. Tax evasion
This variety of corruption cases should, from the government, or state,
point of view, be rooted out. Indeed, after the state has chosen a certain tax
scheme, it would be wise to implement it instead of allowing for some cor-
ruption in the tax collecting administration causing, as we know, additional
distortions (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993)); the central government should
better correct the tax scheme and maintain it as much as possible. That is
why models of this kind of corruption should bear an enormous normative a-
vor by specifying conditions under which resources put into suppressing tax
evasion will be allocated optimally, taking into account not only benets but
also costs of ghting such corruption. Presumably one of the most ecient
measures is provoking corruption, that is, when a certain portion of bureau-
crats (or, conversely, producers) are articial in that they oer (or try to
extort) bribes and then inform central authority which agents accepted this
proposal. However, such a measure is sometimes considered to be immoral
for it is associated with KGB practice, at least in Russia.
More scrupulous analysis should take into account the fact that tax eva-
sion is a kind of a free rider's problem, since taxes are usually collected in
9
order to provide various public goods (such as infrastructure, health and de-
fence institutions and so on). Then, the primary question is how to convince
tax payers that their money are used for good purposes. Unfortunately, in
today's Russia, this is not the case, as it is commonly believed, and often
taxes are simply lost, if not appropriated by inuential authorities. Knowing
that, it is hardly possible to refer to this social argument in collecting taxes.
Anyway, this approach requires eorts in analysing the demand side of the
economy, a consumers' income structure, gains and losses from corruption
throughout the whole population, and so on. This line of research is quite
popular now; see, e.g., Vasin and Panova (2000), Chander and Wilde (1992),
Sanchez and Sobel (1993).
2. Articial cost reduction
Examples of articial cost reduction include the following: illegal access to
a channel of a cheaper input, reduced provision of alternative resources used
in production processes and allowance for the non-usage of anti-pollution
technology, for instance, allowance to pollute the athmosphere, waters and
ground with poison and radioactive waste. This branch is intimately con-
nected with other branches in economic research, such as a general analysis
of rent-seeking activities, a theory of externalities and so on. Probably, as far
as pollution is concerned, corruption must be eradicated entirely, for should
we refer to a cost-benet analysis, trading o losses from corruption against
expenses to ght it, we immediately nd that one cannot assess losses ade-
quately. Indeed, to do this, one must take into account future generations
which probably will not favor today's policimakers for their comparative stat-
ics exercises. Even when the task to evaluate future ecological losses from
corruption seems tractable, no one is able to choose a fair discount rate.
As for alternative inoensive privileges, there is a question of how harmful
corruption actually is. Indeed, regulation is a matter of distant government
organizations (e.g., Parliament) and is unique and inelastic, so to speak,
whereas in every specic situation knowledge of actual conditions may well
turn out to be more important. Therefore, even from the government's posi-
tion, suppressing corruption entirely may not be necessary, and the analysis
of such controversial situations should presumably be of a positive nature,
providing us with a deeper general comprehension of various mechanisms,
such as how bureaucrats would respond to alternative anti-corruption mea-
sures and how a structure of corrupt relations (as well as the average level of
corruption) would change if we try to gradually develop a new institutional
design.
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The next item is closely related to the one just described, but it contains
quite interesting topics for discussion; besides, it lies at the base of the model
introduced and studied below.
3. Illegal provision of a complementary production input
Under conditions of underdeveloped institutional infrastructure, which
can be thought of as a common complementary resource, that is, a public
good provision, it is often important for a producer to organize private, al-
ternative resource, for his use. At this point, bureaucrats may be in a good
position by possessing dierent such resources, e.g., having the discretion to
dislocate rms elsewhere, or to open access to capacities of some state plant
or factory, or to sell machinery or other objects which are formally written
o. It would be naive to pretend to take into account all possible methods
of illegal enrichment in exchange for a bribe. However, one could imagine
a common remedy against corruption in all such situations: intensifying the
provision of the public good in appropriate amounts. The neccesity of bribing
ocials would then seem to evaporate or be substantially reduced, together
with the average corruption level. It is the formalization of the mechanisms
described above which we call the impact of the fundamental, or external,
factors on the main parameters of a model of a corrupt economy.
1.4 A societal factor
In contrast with the fundamental factor (which is the possibility of collusion
between bureaucrat and producer due to an imperfect environment), societal
factors do not allow for such explicit description. To begin with, let us
recall that externalities occur whenever a utility of a given agent is directly
aected by the other agents' actions. As everyone knows, it would be a
mistake not to take external eects into account, for this results in a distorted
view of a quantitative, and sometimes even qualitative, picture. An extreme
case can take place when multiplicity of equilibria is being overlooked, or
stability/instability of some equilibria is incorrectly prescribed, as a result of
underestimating external eects.
Why is it logically natural to expect externalities to work when studying
corruption? Imagine the following typical situation (see Polterovich (1998),
and, within a somewhat more general framework, Sah (1991)). Assume that
a xed amount of resources, a budget, is allocated to ghting corruption.
Provided violations of the law are rare enough, this budget is sucient to
11
fully screen all such cases, at least to make a punishment quite likely. On
the contrary, if a situation is out of control, and law violations (corruption
cases) abound, our budget is insucient to adequately confront outlaws, since
any given violation receives only a tiny fraction of resources, thus making
corruption almost free of charge. As a result, the probability of detection is
small.
Not only does a scenario where burnt being caught reveal these kind of
externalities. A typical situation is when everybody knows what is going on
and the costs from being corrupt take the form of ill reputation, or simply
of a bribe to the superior bureaucrat. In both cases one can observe the
same principle: when everyone is stealing, the reputation of being a thief is
not that severe (everything is evaluated comparatively). In the latter sce-
nario, the superior ultimately becomes rich enough by extorting bribes from
many subordinates, which is probably reected in charging smaller individual
bribes. As a result, the suborninates' costs are reduced. This seems to be a
suitable description of the highly corrupt authorities in the Russian economy.
From the formal point of view, we should assume that costs from corrup-
tion is a function depending not only on the level of individual involvement
in corrupt relations by a given bureaucrat (shortly: an individual's corrup-
tion level), but also on every other bureaucrat's choice, thus being a function
of many arguments (the same number of arguments as the number of bu-
reaucrats). Naturally, costs are assumed to increase in the rst argument
(corresponding to the individual level of involvement in corruption) and de-
crease in the others (reecting external eects just described). However, in
order to simplify matters, as well as to follow the idea that bureaucrats are
numerous and each of them have a negligible impact on the fundamentals
of the economy, we will assume that the cost function depends only on two
arguments, of which the rst one represents an individual's corruption level,
while the second one stands for the average bureaucrats' corruption level,
3
and that the costs are increasing in the rst argument and decreasing in the
second one.
3
Polterovich (1998) simplies the cost function (the \probability of detection" in his
context) further on to depend only on the second argument, i.e., the average level, leaving
aside the individual's choice. However, as we will see later, such a simplication results in
the underevaluation of the role of external eects in determining the average corruption
level.
12
If one is to follow literally the scenario just described, he/she at once con-
fronts the exogenous nature of the external eects generated by bureaucrats
among each other, in which case these externalities are just one of the char-
acteristics of the economics of corruption. Therefore, one can do no better
than to simply state its positive or negative role in determining the average
corruption level. However, might we relax this implicit assumption of exo-
geneity of a detection (and punishment) scheme (see below), we immediately
get a (possibly) strong instrument of economic policy: varying this scheme of
punishment, one probably could essentially decrease the average corruption
level through the impact that the choice of a specic detection scheme has
on the power of external eects among bureaucrats, even remaining within
the frame of the (xed, for the time being) overall budget. And the primary
problem with implementing such a policy measure consists of our undercom-
prehension of even the sign of its eect
4
on both the average and individual
corruption levels. And, in turn, this sign depends on the sign of externali-
ties' impact and on the direction in externalities' power evolution during the
scheme's variation.
In this paper, the rst step is made towards endogenizing punishment
schemes and choosing the optimal one among all possible schemes or a certain
sub-class of them. A special case is analysed where the cost function (which
is an image, or a transformation, of a detection scheme) depends on two
arguments: a personal degree of involvement in corrupt relations, and the
overall (or the average) corruption level in a system under study. Of all such
schemes, which one is the optimal, in the sense of minimizing the average
corruption level? Put another way, how strongly should one refer to the
average corruption level when considering a bureaucrat's corrupt actions? A
formal conterpart of this question is not that simple since, while formalizing,
one should have in mind the xed budget assumption and take a formal
account of it in a precise manner (or, at least, implicitly). Otherwise a simple
increase in the amount of resources to ght corruption denitely suppresses
4
This contrasts with some popular measures against corruption, such as increasing
penalties or enlarging the budget allocated to suppressing corruption etc., when one can
be condent of the sign of the eect of their implementation. Unfortunately, the latter
ones often require substantial resources when being implemented. The variation of the
detection scheme does not require that many resources, but, vice-versa, one should check
that he/she is not doing a bad thing for society by altering the scheme of punishment.
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the average level.
For more on these issues, see Chapter 3. In the next chapter the basic
model of corruption in production process is introduced and analysed, to a
certain degree. Then, I use this model to compare alternative punishment
schemes, which is presented later in the paper.
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2 A basic model of corrupt relations in the
production process
2.1 Model specication
We start with an economy consisting of producers and ocials interacting
with each other in the following manner. Every ocial is associated with a
certain group of producers, and can serve the group in some illegal manner,
in exchange for bribes. Every ocial chooses the scale of an illegal activity
(i.e., the amount of service provided for a given producer) to be an arbitrary
nonnegative real number. The only thing that worries him is the possibility
(and the degree) of punishment which increases with the level of aggregated
illegal service supplied by this ocial to all his or her producers. (Sometimes
we refer to the level of aggregate illegal service produced by a given ocial
as the degree of personal involvement in corruption, in contrast with the
overall corruption level, which is the average of all the individual degrees.)
Generalising, we call this service an illegal resource supply. However, costs
from being corrupt are partially mitigated by externalities emerging among
bureaucrats when they make their corrupt deals. Specically, the higher
the average level of involvement in corruption (shortly, the corruption level),
the lower are the costs shared by every given bureaucrat.
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Below is the
mathematical formalization of this mechanism.
Assume i{th bureaucrat is serving N
i
producers and supplies j{th pro-
ducer with an q
ij
{amount service, where q
ij
2 [0; 1] or [0;+1). We focus
our analysis on the last case for the time being. The scale of aggregated
illegal activity of a given bureaucrat (we will also refer to it as the degree of
a personal involvement) equals q
i
=
P
j
q
ij
. Let us state that the costs from
corruption are '(q
i
; q
av
), where q
av
is the average corruption level. The cost
5
Recall that this is a somewhat simplied version of a general problem where costs are
determined by the prole of all bureaucrats' corruption levels.
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function is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
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'(q; q) is a convex function of q:
(1)
The rst assumption states that irrespective of the average level, an honest
agent bears no costs. The second and the third ones express in a formal
way that costs from being corrupt increase with the personal degree of in-
volvement and decrease with the second argument representing the average
corruption level in the system. The forth assumption states that marginal,
not only total, costs decrease when the average corruption level rises (this is
quite natural: an increase in the average degree of involvement in corruption
changes the overall scale of measurement of corruption, thus, its measurement
units as well). The fth one is a standard convexity assumption.
The only controversial assumption is the sixth one. Let us justify it
by investigating the nature of the external eects reected in the negative
dependance of the cost function on its second argument. Imagine a society
comprised of identical bureaucrats perfectly repeating each others' actions
(hence, their choices coincide). Naturally, in such a society, each agent's
costs are equal to
 (q
i
) = '(q
i
; q
i
): (2)
The sixth assumption reects the fact that convexity still holds for this imag-
inary society: otherwise simultaneous increase of all corruption levels pro-
duces economies of scale in costs, which would inevitably lead to a \corrup-
tion bubble;" we rule out this possibility here.
Now we introduce a basic notion. We say that the external eects are
absent if the cost function of any given agent depends only on his own cor-
ruption level and precisely according to (2), i.e., as if he were placed into a
society of identical agents perfectly repeating his actions. One could think of
this denition in the following manner: a society is heterogeneous, and every
type of agent is represented by many of them, and the central authority bal-
ances the budget in a way that guarantees independence of dierent groups'
6
Note that ' could exhibit a jump in zero rising from, say, moral costs following dis-
honest behavior or from the possibility of revealing a corrupt act per se. When analysing
the situation, one must carefully distinguish a case with a jump.
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choices. As for the possibility of maintaining the overall budget xed, this is
arguable; still, uctuations of the budget required are believed to be insu-
cient provided groups are numerous and truly independent in their actions.
However, in the spirit of my research, it is interactions between groups
that matter; hence, the absence of externalities is imaginary. We refer to
it only as a reference point, as will be explained later on when turn to the
comparison of alternative punishment schemes.
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I have characterised costs from corrupt activity. As for the benets it
promises ocials, they result from bribe collections. Every given bureaucrat
extort bribes in exchange for the illegal services he oers to producers under
his jurisdiction. In the current setting (throughout the paper) we are not
taking into account the fact that, ceteris paribus, the higher the bribe ex-
torted, the more probable is its detection (such a relaxation corresponds to
the case where the mechanism of detection does not include denunciations
at all, being directly linked to an illegal activity per se).
Recalling that an ocial is a monopolist in providing illegal services to his
producers, we will assume that he extorts the maximum that every producer
is willing to pay for this service. Such an assumption is extreme in (at least)
two aspects. First, it implies common knowledge of the production possi-
bilities, which is a good approximation only when repeated interactions are
under study. But repeated interactions give rise to various aspects (such as
dynamics) not touched upon here. When assymmetric information is present,
the more realistic is the assumption that an ocial charges a unique price for
his/her service, as in Polterovich (1998). Secondly, even when bureaucrats
are well informed about technology, some bargaining power is in producers'
hands and, e.g., a Nash bargaining solution could be a better approximation.
However, we ignore here these objections, assuming extortion of the maxi-
mum feasible bribe.
8
In order to characterise this maximum bribe, we now
7
Probably one suggests that we can model a free-of-externalities scheme in an alterna-
tive manner, namely as  (q
i
) = '(q
i
; 0). However, following our general methodology, this
scheme corresponds, on the contrary, to a situation of individual deviation from honest
behavior, when all the other agents are not involved in corrupt relations. The formula
given above shows costs from such a deviation and plays a crucial role in determining
whether a corruption-free equilibrium actually exists.
8
A case of a Nash bargaining solution seems to deviate not very far from that considered,
until comparative statics with respect to the relative bargaining power of bureaucrats and
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proceed to a description of the production process.
In the i-th region, the j-th producer possesses a production function of the
form F
ij
(M
ij
; g
i
; q
ij
) which depends on three arguments: the money stock,
the level of public good provision, or infrastructure, in this region,
9
and illegal
services supplied by the i-th region's ocial.
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The production function is
assumed to satisfy the following (more or less standard) conditions (omitting
indices of region and of producer, as well as arguments of the production
function; instead, subscripts denote marginal factors, from now on):
F (0; 0; 0) = 0; F
0
i
> 0; i = 1; 2; 3;
F
00
ii
< 0; i = 1; 2; 3; F
00
1i
> 0; i = 2; 3:
(3)
The rst three properties show that all the factors are essential in production,
but the production function exhibits diminishing returns, with respect to
them. The last one means that the marginal productivity of the money
factor increases with the rise in either the provision of a public good or an
illegal service. As for the sign of the last mixed derivative, F
00
23
, it is not
specied. We will nd in 2.2 that this sign crucially aects the eciency of
a given anti-corruption measure, namely, an additional provision of a public
good.
In the case of the refusal to provide an illegal service (or to accept this
service), a producer has F
ij
(M
ij
; g
i
; 0) 6= 0
11
; otherwise, if an illegal act occurs
and a bribe of b
ij
is paid, a producer has F
ij
(M
ij
  b
ij
; g
i
; q
ij
). According to
the approach chosen, we should use the following equation to determine the
amount of an individual bribe:
F
ij
(M
ij
  b
ij
(q
ij
); g
i
; q
ij
) = F
ij
(M
ij
; g
i
; 0): (4)
producers is conducted.
9
It is possible that a public good is provided in a centralized manner, i.e., uniformly
across all the regions in our system. Although we omit such a case here, comparing it to the
one considered in the paper may turn out to be benecial for our complete understanding
of corruption in production processes.
10
One could introduce several arguments of any of these three dierent types, but prob-
ably it will generate no new ideas. It seems sucient to refer to these basic arguments as
generalised ones.
11
I assume that the price of a product is constant and unique.
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The overall bribe collection of a given bureaucrat then equals
P
j
b
ij
(q
ij
),
provided our bureaucrat has come into collusion with every producer under
his jurisdiction, dividing the overall illegal services of q
i
between them in
a certain manner. Note that the overall bribe collection does not exceed
P
j
M
ij
, which is the overall money stock of the i-th region's producers.
Of course, whatever q
i
has been chosen, an ocial will try to allocate it
optimally between rms. Hence, every bureaucrat rst solves the following
problem:
P
j
b
ij
(q
ij
)  ! max;
s:t:
P
j
q
ij
 q
i
; q
ij
 0;
(5)
for all q
i
> 0. We begin with the analysis of this very problem.
First of all, it is necessary to study the behavior of functions b
ij
which
are known to us as implicit solutions of (4). The rule of implicit functions'
derivation leads us to the following equation (subscripts are omitted again):
 F
0
1
(M   b(q); g; q)  b
0
(q) + F
0
3
(M   b(q); g; q)  0; (6)
thus, increasing q, one increases the value of the bribe necessary to be pro-
vided with q units of an illegal resource (as expected).
Taking the second derivatives (and omitting arguments also), we get:
F
0
1
 b
00
(q) = F
00
11
 b
02
(q)  2F
00
13
 b
0
(q) + F
00
33
: (7)
We infer, therefore, that functions b
ij
(q
ij
) are concave, as the corollary of the
properties of production functions claimed in (3). Also, it is not dicult to
calculate the derivative of b
ij
at zero, using (6): it equals
F
0
3
(M;g; 0)
F
0
1
(M;g; 0)
.
Let us now summarize the properties of functions b
ij
(q
ij
) (omitting sub-
scripts of the corresponding production function):
b
ij
(0) = 0; b
0
ij
(q
ij
) > 0; b
00
ij
(q
ij
) < 0;
b
0
ij
(0) =
F
0
3
(M;g; 0)
F
0
1
(M;g; 0)
; b
ij
(q
ij
) M:
(8)
Starting from these properties, one could formulate and prove the following
assertion.
Theorem 1 For every q
i
, problem (5) has a unique solution. Denote the re-
sulting amount of the bribe collection by b
i
(q
i
). Then, the following properties
19
hold:
b
i
(0) = 0; b
0
i
(q
i
) > 0; b
00
i
< 0;
b
0
i
(0) = max
j
(b
0
ij
(0)); b
i
(q
i
) is bounded above:
(9)
For Proof, see Appendix.
We now introduce an equilibrium concept to our economy. Let us start
with the agent's problem. Provided there are many agents in our system,
every given agent's choice of his/her level of involvement in corrupt relations
has an innitesimal impact on the average level of corruption. Neglecting
this impact, we wrote the agent's problem like
b
i
(q
i
)  '(q
i
; q
av
)  ! max
q
i
0
: (10)
Denition. We call corruption equilibrium a bundle (q
av
; q
1
; q
2
; :::::; q
K
),
where K is the number of agents (i.e., bureaucrats), such that, for any i, q
i
is
a solution to (10), and, in addition, a balance condition holds which requires
that
q
av
=
1
K
X
i
q
i
: (11)
Before turning to the detailed equilibrium analysis including agents' be-
havior and comparative statics with respect to various parameters, we will
consider a digression concerning the role of a public good in determining the
equilibrium level of corruption.
2.2 The role of public good provision
Consider the economy described above. Assume that the level of public
good provision is an exogenuous variable in our system thus serving as an
instrument at the hand of the government. What consequences are brought
about by an increase/decrease in this exogenuous parameter?
In such a situation, we are primarily interested in the eect that a change
in public good provision has on functions b
ij
(q
ij
). Omitting subscripts, we
should analyse the behavior of an implicit function satisfying the following
equation:
F (M   b(g; q); g; q) = F (M;g; q); (12)
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when g changes. Taking the derivative of (12) with respect to g, one gets:
@b
@g
=
F
0
2
(M   b; g; q)  F
0
2
(M;g; 0)
F
0
1
(M   b; g; q)
: (13)
The denominator is positive while the sign of the numerator depends crucially
on the sign of a mixed derivative, F
00
23
(recall that we have not yet specied
this sign). Provided a public good and an illegal resource are substitutes,
one has F
00
23
< 0; hence (using properties of production functions postulated
in (3),
F
0
2
(M   b; g; q) < F
0
2
(M;g; q)  F
0
2
(M;g; 0): (14)
This means that the maximum bribe decreases when q rises. Moreover, the
same holds if a public good and an illegal resource are weak complements.
Thus, in the two cases just described, corruption opportunities of bureaucrats
become worse o with the increase in public good provision. It is easy to
show that, in turn, this leads to a decrease in the average corruption level.
On the contrary, if corruption deals result in an improved returns on
the public good factor, the eect could be of the opposite sign (though being
slightly mitigated by a decreased money factor: a part of a producer's money
is spent on the corresponding bribe). Therefore, when considering such a
measure (namely, increasing public good provision), one should analyse the
specic features of the production process.
Consider an example. Let the production function be
F (M;g; q) =M

(g + q)

; ;  > 0: (15)
One can see that instead of a poorly provided public good, a bureaucrat
supplies producers with an absolutely identical factor of production, but
illegally and in the private form (for example: local channels on TV, or
simply doing his obligations but in exchange for bribes). Then, a mixed
derivative which is of our interest is
F
00
23
=M

(   1)(g + q)
 2
; (16)
and it is negative only for  < 1. Hence, a public good and an illegal resource
are substitutes for  < 1, and complements for  > 1. However, the necessary
bribe, in fact, decreases for all . To prove this, we just solve (15) explicitly.
What we get is the following formula for the bribe:
b(g; q) =M 
2
4
1 
 
g
g + q
!
=
3
5
=M 
2
4
1 
 
1 
q
g + q
!
=
3
5
; (17)
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obviously, bribe b is a decreasing function of g.
2.3 Equilibrium analysis
We have introduced the notion of an equilibrium in section 2.1. Now we
examine its existence, uniqueness and stability properties. In order to avoid
excessive subscripts and tedious calculations, we reorganize our basic model
a little bit. Assume that there is a community of bureaucrats each of them
characterized by his type, , and a distribution function F () is given ex-
plicitly. The type of an agent represents his corruption opportunities. More
precisely, assume that a common corruption opportunity function b(q; ) is
given, which depends on the two arguments and is characterized, for a xed
, by the properties postulated in (9), at the same time being an increasing
function in , together with its derivative with respect to q. Thus, the higher
is , the better are the corruption opportunities of an agent of type . Below
we summarize the properties of function b(q; ):
b(0; ) = 0;
@b
@q
(q; ) > 0;
@
2
b
@q
2
(q; ) < 0;
@b
@
(q; ) > 0;
@
2
b
@q@
(q; ) > 0;
8 9 q^() :
@b
@q
(q^(); ) = 0:
(18)
The last condition slightly diers from the assumption that the function
b(q; ) is bounded above, which is a direct consequense of (9). However,
the generality of this discussion is not strongly limited: in the case when
q varies on [0;+1) one can simply implement a corresponding monotonic
reparametrization with respect to q.
Besides, for the purpose of convenience, we also make a monotonic trans-
formation with respect to , such that
  q^(): (19)
This is possible since q^() is strictly increasing in , which follows directly
from the postulated properties (18).
The problem of an agent of type  looks as before in (10):
12
b(q; )  '(q; q
av
)  ! max
q0
; (20)
12
Again, we assume no individual agent aects q
av
when choosing his q(). From the
22
where '(q; q
av
) is the function characterizing costs of corruption (see subsec-
tion 2.1). Here we reproduce its properties again:
'(0; q
av
) = 0;
@'
@q
(q; q
av
) > 0;
@'
@q
av
(q; q
av
) < 0;
@
2
'
@q@q
av
(q; q
av
) < 0;
@
2
'
@q
2
(q; q
av
) > 0;
'(q; q) is a convex function:
(21)
The rst-order conditions for (20) take the form of
@b
@q
(q; ) 
@'
@q
(q; q
av
);
with strict equality for q > 0:
(22)
Denition. A bundle (q

av
; q

()) is said to be an equilibrium if, for every ,
a value q

() solves problem (20) when q
av
= q

av
, and the balance condition
holds:
13
Z
q

()dF () = q

av
: (23)
One can check that the model with a nite number of bureaucrats intro-
duced in section 2.1 is in fact a special case of the one just described, and
corresponds to a discrete distribution function F . In the general case, we
assume that the expected value of the type is nite:

av
= E =
Z
dF () < +1: (24)
We now turn to the analysis of equilibria in this economy, proceeding in
three steps. First, we study the behavior of agents when q
av
is xed. In the
next step, we aggregate individual choices into a reaction function:
	(q
av
) =
Z
q(; q
av
)dF (); (25)
mathematical point of view, this means that the distribution F has no atoms, or, at least,
all atoms have a negligible size.
13
Note that this modication of the basic model admits another interpretation: a game
of incomplete information! Agents know their own types and, in addition, a precise form
of the distribution function over the set of all types. Based on these data, every agent
chooses his q. The denition introduced above is exactly a denition of a Bayesian{Nash
Equilibrium for this game.
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Figure 1: First-order conditions (
1
< 
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< 
3
)
where q(; q
av
) is the choice of an agent of a type , provided the average
level of corruption equals q
av
. One can easily note that equilibria are then
represented by points of intersection of the reaction function with the diago-
nal line; in the nal step, we prove the existence and study some properties
of equilibria in our economy.
As a rst step, assume that q
av
is xed. First order conditions (22) have,
depending on , an interior (positive) or a corner (zero) solution. Check
that the right hand sides of (22) are identical for all . Let us illustrate
this situation graphically (see Figure 1). Note, however, that the rst-order
conditions correctly specify agents' choices only in the continuous case. If,
on the contrary, the cost function exhibits a jump in zero (denote the jump
value by '
0
), than part of the agents for whom the resulting utility (i.e., the
utility when choosing the point of intersection) is less than zero would prefer
to abstain from corruption.
For the time being, we denote the actual choice function by q(; q
av
),
retaining our old notation q(; q
av
) for the solution of the equation (22). We
also continue to use the term resulting utility for the utility of an agent who
has chosen q(; q
av
). Thus, the resulting utility could be either positive or
negative while the actual utility is always a nonnegative number.
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Lemma 2.1 The resulting utility is a nondecreasing function of . As a
consequence, provided there is a jump in zero, the agents' choice function
has the form
q(; q
av
) =
8
<
:
q(; q
av
); for  


0; for  <


; (26)
where

 satises the following equation:
b(q;

)  '(q; q
av
)  '
0
= 0: (27)
Proof. One can either take the derivative of b(q; )  '(q; q
av
)  '
0
in a
straightforward way, having (22) in mind, or refer to the Envelope Theorem
(see, e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), p. 964) which states that
a full derivative of a maximand (here of the resulting utility function) with
respect to some parameter equals the partial derivative with respect to this
parameter taken in the argmaximumpoint. In our case, this partial derivative
is @b=@, and the assertion follows from properties (18). Particulary, there
exists at most one cut-o level

 for which the resulting utility equals zero.
Agents whose type  <

 would prefer not to be involved in corruption at
all, others will choose q(; q
av
). The proof is complete.
Lemma 2.2 The agents' choice function is nondecreasing in , continuous
for continuous cost functions, and discontinuous for cost functions exhibit-
ing a jump in zero. The actual utility function is always continuous and
increasing.
Proof. We simply take the derivative of the solution to (22) with respect
to parameter , using the properties of the corruption opportunities function:
@q
@
=  
@
2
b=@q@
@
2
b=@q
2
> 0: (28)
Hence, the choice function q(; q
av
) is continuous and increasing in . The
actual choice function, q(; q
av
), completely coincides with q(; q
av
) when the
cost function is continuous, and coincides with it starting from

 when there
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a
Figure 2: Agents choice function, q(; q
av
) (the continuity case)
is a jump in zero. Properties of the actual utility function are direct conse-
quences of the properties of the resulting utility. The proof is complete.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate agents' choice functions, depending on whether
the cost function exhibits a jump in zero.
The next step is to vary q
av
and analyse the reaction function 	(q
av
).
The behavior of individual choices when q
av
varies is characterized in the
next lemma.
Lemma 2.3 When q
av
increases, an agent's choice function cannot decrease;
the same holds for the agent's utility.
Proof. This time, all that changes is the right hand side of the rst-order
conditions (22). For an interior solution, we have
@q
@q
av
=
@
2
'=@q@q
av
@
2
b=@q
2
> 0; (29)
using (18), (21). Repeating this exercise for an agent's utility, one should
just recall the Envelope Theorem (a partial derivative of the utility function
with respect to q
av
equals  
@'
@q
av
> 0). If the corner solution takes place, we
have q = 0, and the actual utility equals zero as well, hence, both could only
increase or remain the same. The proof is complete.
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Figure 3: Agents choice function, q(; q
av
) (the case of a jump in zero)
We illustrate this fact graphically (see Figure 4). When q
av
increases, the
curve representing marginal costs shifts downwards. The family of marginal
revenue curves remains the same. Hence, the choice of a given agent cannot
decrease (some agents, as one can see from the gure, may even become
corrupt due to such a change).
Lemma 2.4 The reaction function 	(q
av
) is nondecreasing and bounded above.
Proof. The nondecreasing property of 	 follows from its integral repre-
sentation (see denition (25)) and from Lemma 2.3. Moving further along,
one can note that the last property in (18) guarantees that the choice of
an agent with type  could not exceed q^(). Recalling our reparametriza-
tion (19) and, nally, the niteness assumption (24), we can construct a
chain of inequalities:
	(q
av
) =
Z
q(; q
av
)dF () 
Z
dF () = 
av
< +1; (30)
uniformly with respect to q
av
. The proof is complete.
Now we proceed to the nal step of the analysis. One can observe that
stable equilibria are those rest points of a 	-mapping for which the reaction
curve intersects the diagonal line from above (see Figure 5).
14
But such points
14
Indeed, a standard iterating approach argument is applicable in our situation (see,
e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Chapter 17, p. 620).
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3
)
always exist, as follows from the Tarskii's Fixed Point Theorem reproduced
below.
Theorem 2 A nondecreasing and bounded mapping of the closed interval [0;+1)
into itself has at least one stable rest point.
Note that continuity is not required here. We are not going to prove this
theorem, for it is a pure mathematical fact. However, let us discuss it. Look
at Figure 6. Either one has a 	-curve which lies entirely below the diagonal
line (in which case the only equilibrium is zero, and it is stable), or there is a
nonempty subset of positive real numbers such that, the 	-curve lies above
the diagonal line in corresponding points. Taking the suppremum of this set,
one gets the stable equilibrium (in fact, the one with the maximum level of
corruption).
Let us summarize our ndings.
Theorem 3 The model characterized by (20) and (23) always admits at least
one stable equilibrium. In every stable equilibrium, a choice of an agent is
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Figure 5: Stable and unstable equilibria
q
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Figure 6: The Tarskii's Fixed Point Theorem
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a nondecreasing function of . If the cost function has a jump in zero, then
there exists a cut-o value

 such that for  <

, choices of agents q

() = 0,
while q

(

) > 0. In the case of continuity of the cost function, the choice
function q

() is continuous. The utility function is always continuous and
nondecreasing, with respect to .
So, we have established the existence of at least one stable equilibrium.
Usually (especially when the cost function exhibits a jump in zero) the
model described above allows for two stable equilibria, of which the one
is corruption-free and the other is characterized by a high level of corrup-
tion. Also, there exists an unstable equilibrium which serves as a boundary
point between zones of attraction. All in all, however, the precise number
of equilibria depends on some additional assumptions, and it is not easy to
characterize all the possible situations. The question of stability of a given
equilibrium is quite dicult as well, even when the corruption-free equilib-
rium is concerned. We left these details alone in the current paper, assuming
instead that our system \lives" in one of the stable corruption equilibria, and
study comparative statics around it.
The rst question one probably wishes to ask regards that of a compari-
son between long-run and short-run perspectives when considering a change
in a certain parameter. In the framework of the static model, the possibility
to discuss short- and long-run periods may seem amazing; still, it sometimes
exists. We simply take that in the short-term period a new q
av
is being de-
termined through the choices of agents (after a change in parameters occurs)
holding their expectations xed (hereby, assuming the agents' best responses
on the old q
av
). But in this case it is nothing else than the denition of the
reaction function! Thus, we take the short-run reaction to the parameters'
change to be equal to
~q
av
= 	(q
av
; ); (31)
where  is the parameter (or a group of parameters) under consideration. As
for the long-run, it is a new equilibrium, i.e., the solution to the equation
15
q
av
() = 	(q
av
(); ): (32)
15
We require that, when possible, after a small change in parameters, the system doesn't
switch to a qualitatively new equilibrium. Thus, we are searching for the solution to (32)
close to the previous one.
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Figure 7: Comparative statics: short- and long-run perspectives
A typical situation is illustrated by Figure 7. Suppose some parameters of
our system change. Provided it used to be in a stable equilibrium, the system
(i.e., the average corruption level) moves from q
av
to 	(q
av
) in the short-run.
However, in the long-run, our system approaches a new equilibrium, and
the peculiarity of the model considered is that the long-run eect exeeds the
short-run one in absolute terms. This is easily seen from Figure 7: the nature
of this phenomenon is the same as that of a multiplicity of equilibria, namely,
it comes from an increasing property of 	 (we omit the technical details of
this reasoning). Thus, we have proved the following important theorem.
Theorem 4 In the model considered, long-run shifts in the average level of
corruption, in response to alternative parameters' changes, exceed those in
the short-run perspective.
Concluding this chapter, recall that the model introduced above has ap-
plications going far beyond the scope of corrupt relations in the production
process; moreover, and beyond the scope of corruption in general, having
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to deal with a broad class of crime and punishment situations. One can
check that the only crucial assumption for its applicability is that this kind
of criminal activity be of Becker's type, i.e., where individuals compare costs
(the risk of detection) and benets (usually monetary) from crime (and, in
addition, that agents make continuous choices). Then, most of the properties
of functions b(q; ), '(q; q
av
) still hold, together with the mathematical state-
ment of a problem per se. I use here the term \corruption" since historically
the most important questions arose in the context of corruption, but our
main conclusions are relevant for theft, tax evasion, etc. Probably corrupt
relations are characterized by a huge dierentiation in opportunities (hence,
in possible benets), which is a justication of introducing explicitly various
types of agents. However, the basic question raised here is important in all
the scenarios listed above (and in many other ones, as well). Namely: how
do variations in the scheme of punishment aect the average corruption (or
a criminal) level?
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3 The role of external eects among bureau-
crats
3.1 Alternative punishment schemes
From the formal point of view, a scheme of punishment is characterized by the
consequences of its implementation, that is, by a function showing costs from
corrupt activity which are shared by bureaucrats. The previous chapter dealt
with a xed cost function linked to a denite (implicit) scheme of punishment.
In the current chapter, on the contrary, we state the problem of choosing the
optimal (at least, second-best) scheme, thus considering (and comparing)
dierent schemes simultaneously. This takes the form of choosing the optimal
cost function '(q; q
av
),
16
according to a denite criterion. Throughout the
paper, our criterion would be to minimize the average corruption level, which,
in turn, is the solution to problem (20) and (23) studied in the previous
chapter.
Apparently our task is trivial unless we introduced a sort of a budget
constraint: one simply should specify ' to be innitely large for all pairs of
arguments. In order to make sense, we must take into account a xed budget
which the policymaker could operate. A straightforward way here would be to
introduce a budget constraint explicitly, but it is not that simple for reasons of
strategic interactions between the policymaker and bureaucrats: the budget
constraint itself depends on the decisions of the bureaucrats. Hence, this is a
new story, and it is left for further research. In the current context, I elaborate
on some trivial consequences of a xed budget, in the framework of the model
studied. Imagine (as in the previous chapter) a society consisting of identical
bureaucrats all of them choosing one and the same level of corruption equal
to q
av
. The cost burden of any given bureaucrat does not depend on the
scheme of punishment being chosen and is determined exclusively by the
overall amount of resources allocated for ghting corruption.
17
In a formal
16
More generally, one wishes to choose a function '(q()) depending on the whole pro-
le of individual corruption levels, though in the current context this problem is a bit
simplied.
17
It is true, unless bureaucrats could be distinguished from each other, having a sort of
label, and this labelling is deliberately taken into account. We exclude this possibility from
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way (taking into account a xed budget implicit condition), let us state that
function
 (q
av
) = '(q
av
; q
av
)  const (33)
is an exogenuos characteristic of our system (for this is the cost function for
identical bureaucrats in a society where q
av
is the average level of corruption
(hence, q
av
equals individual levels as well). We call this introduced one{
argument function a diagonal of the function ', due to the nature of its
construction. Thus, our (last) binding assumption is that the policymaker
could not aect the diagonal of the cost function.
Even when this requirement is taken into account, there remain innitely
many degrees of freedom in choosing a specic scheme of punishment. Based
on a given scheme, one may vary costs for alternative values of q, pro-
vided (21) and (33) hold. As a limit, one may (in an imaginary situation)
implement a 	-scheme, that is, a free-of-externalities scheme where costs of
a given agent depend only on his own actions, as if he were a representative
of a homogenuous society of bureaucrats. For such a scheme, costs equal
 (q), which justies our title. This scheme would be our main reference
point in the space of all the schemes (i.e., cost functions). The 	-scheme,
rstly, reveals no external eects among bureaucrats and, secondly, serves as
an imaginary limit of a process of a deliberate decrease in external eects for
all the other possible schemes simultaneously, as reqired in (33). That is, our
space of cost functions, as bounded by conditions (1) and (33), has a nice
topological structure: it has one focal point with the property that all the
curves from other points are approaching it if these curves are constructed by
the gradual weakening of external eects. This is quite simple, for decreasing
external eects means just approaching the diagonal, which is required to be
unique for all the cost functions. The assertion below claries our intuition
further.
Assertion 3.1 Whatever initial scheme '(q; q
av
) has been chosen, the fol-
lowing inequalities hold which show that the free-of-externalities scheme is
aected by an individual choice of an agent in the lowest degree, among all
our considerations.
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Figure 8: The diagonal scheme  (q) is the limit case for all feasible schemes
'(q; q
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other feasible schemes (see Figure 8):
q < q
av
=) '(q; q
av
) <  (q);
q > q
av
=) '(q; q
av
) >  (q):
(34)
Proof. Recalling that the 	-scheme is the diagonal of any other scheme,
hence, of a given scheme ' (that is,  (q) = '(q; q)), we can rewrite, for in-
stance, the rst inequality in the following way: '(q; q
av
) < '(q; q); provided
q < q
av
, this follows directly from decreasing ' with respect to its second
argument; see properties (21).
As a result, one can step-by-step transform a given scheme of punishment
into the free-of-externalities scheme, holding properties (34) during the whole
process of transformation. Putting it another way, among all the curves
G

(q; q
av
)j 2 [0; 1] connecting a given scheme with the 	-scheme, there
exists an (innite-dimensional) family of curves characterized by the following
35
properties:
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8 : G

(q; q
av
) > '(q; q
av
) for 0 < q < q
av
;
G

(q; q
av
) < '(q; q
av
) for q > q
av
;
G

(q; q
av
) = '(q; q
av
) for q = q
av
;
G

(q; q
av
) possesses properties of cost functions (21);
when  = 0 G

(q; q
av
)  '(q; q
av
);
when  = 1 G

(q; q
av
)  '(q; q):
(35)
In the rest of the paper, I will analyse the behavior of the main characteristics
of the equilibrium under consideration when a scheme of punishment (hence,
a cost function) is being varied along such curves (see Figure 9). Parameter
 will be interpreted as the intensity of the externalities in our system,
19
for
along the way of a curve, that is, of this parameter's increase, the scheme of
punishment approaches the free-of-externalities scheme.
3.2 The behavior at zero-point: two basic classes of
families
We are now ready to turn to our main question. Consider a given scheme
of punishment, ', and some family (35) connecting it with the diagonal.
We therefore deal with a parametrized family of economies of corruption,
together with equilibria in these economies. We will call them -economies
and -equilibria, respectively. We are interested in comparative statics with
respect to parameter  introduced above. From now on, we use the terms
scheme of punishment and cost function interchangibly; the term diagonal,
or a diagonal scheme is always used to denote the (unique, common) free-of-
externalities scheme.
20
18
Geometrically, these curves do not move in the opposite direction while approaching
their (common) destination point.
19
To be more precise, parameter  stands for the weakness of external eects.
20
Recall that in reality this scheme could not be implemented; this fact should not
confuse us, since we just refer to innitesimal comparative statics (on the way along a
curve approaching the focal point which is the diagonal scheme), that is, to comparative
statics for small changes in .
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Figure 9: The family of cost functions G

(q; q
av
) connects an initial scheme
'(q; q
av
) and the diagonal one
Using notations introduced above, we can state -problem in the form
which is nearly the same as (20) and (23), namely:
b(q; ) G

(q; q
av
)  ! max
q0
; (36)
Z
q(; q
av
)dF () = q
av
: (37)
Denition. A bundle (q

av
(); q

(; )) is said to form -equilibrium
if, for every , a value q = q

(; ) solves problem (36), and the balance
condition (37) holds.
All that was stated and proved in section 2.3 concerning the existence and
the number of equilibria remains correct for -problems, taking into account
properties (35).
The main question of our paper now could be expressed in the following
manner: What is the eect of small changes in  on the average (equilibrium)
level of corruption, q

av
(), and on individual levels q

(; )?
Assumptions (35) about the behavior of a family of evolving cost functions
include a variety of possible scenarios, from which we pick two groups which
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Figure 10: Family G

(q; q
av
) (the continuous case)
are probably the most important in applications.
The rst group corresponds to the case of continuous cost functions (in-
cluding zero-point). Assumptions (35) suggest the following graphical illus-
tration (see Figure 10). Now we introduce an additional assumption (sug-
gested by Figure 10) that the curvature of the initial scheme is higher than
that of the diagonal one. Formally:
8q
@
2
'
@q
2
(q; q
av
) >  
00
(q): (38)
Among all the families connecting ' with the diagonal, we will analyse only
those for which the curvature (with respect to q) decreases, as  rises (just as
illustrated in Figure 10).
21
In other words, we require that a second derivative
with respect to q decreases as  increases, for any given q. This case will be
studied in section 3.3.
According to the second group of scenarios, all the cost functions of a
family, G

(q; q
av
) have a jump in zero. We distinguish two principal cases:
21
Again, these families approach the focal point smoothly in a geometric sense, being
considered in the (innitely-dimentioned) space of all schemes of punishment.
38
q';G

'
0
q
av
'(q; q
av
)
G

(q; q
av
)
Figure 11: Family G

(q; q
av
) (the case of a unique jump in zero)
when the jump is unique for all cost functions; and when it rises with  (it
apparently could not decrease, as far as properties (35) hold, since
'
0
= lim
q!0
'(q; q
av
)  lim
q!0
G

(q; q
av
) = G
0
; (39)
where we have denoted the value of a jump of a typical cost function in
our family by G
0
). Figures 11 and 12 correspond to the two possibilities,
respectively.
The possibility of a unique jump seems to be not a good approximation
of reality. Indeed, its applicability suggests probably that xed costs from
corruption come solely from moral factors, even free of a common feelings
argument. We dispence of this possibility in favor of concentrating on the
last case when a jump in zero is an increasing function of parameter . Above
that, we deal with those (initial) schemes only for which marginal costs from
corruption exceed marginal costs of the diagonal scheme, for all q. Such a
restriction is suggested by Figure 12. Formally:
8q  0
@'
@q
(q; q
av
) >  
0
(q) =
@'
@q
(q; q) +
@'
@q
av
(q; q): (40)
Note that, when calculating marginal costs of the diagonal scheme, one
should take the full derivative, not a partial one, with respect to the rst ar-
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Figure 12: Family G

(q; q
av
) (the jump varies with )
gument (the latter corresponds to marginal costs of the initial scheme, when
q
av
= q). The same should be kept in mind when looking at inequality (38).
In accordance with what we have done in the continuous case, here we
assume that as  increases, marginal costs of functions in a family mono-
tonically decrease for any given q from values of marginal costs of the initial
scheme to those of the diagonal one.
22
. We analyse the case of a jump in zero
in section 3.4.
3.3 Comparative Statics: the continuous case
In the current section we assume that all the functions in family (35) are
well dened and continuous with respect to q over the full half-axis q 
0, including zero. One can check that properties (35), together with our
additional requirement about second derivatives, result in the following list
22
We again refer to a geometric interpretation in the space of all feasible cost functions:
the class of families chosen satises the smoothness condition, in a sense.
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of assumptions:
G

(q; q
av
) are well dened and continuous over [0;+1);
8 : G

(0; q
av
)  0; G

(q
av
; q
av
)  '(q
av
; q
av
);
@G

@q
(0; q
av
) increases with respect to;
8q
@
2
G

@q
2
(q; q
av
) decreases with respect to ;
G
0
(q; q
av
)  '(q; q
av
); G
1
(q; q
av
)   (q):
(41)
Our task is to analyse how the solution to the problem described by (36)
and (37) changes when  increases. Recall Theorem 4: in every stable equi-
librium, the long-run eect of a change in parameters has the same sign but a
higher amplitude than the short-run eect. The latter was expressed by the
reaction function, 	(q
av
)). Hence, to answer our main question, we should
analyse the behavior of the reaction function 	(; q
av
) (depending on two
arguments, from now on), in response to changes in argument .
Recall the formula for the reaction function:
	(; q
av
) =
Z
q(; ; q
av
)dF (); (42)
where q(; ; q
av
) is an instant response of an agent with type  to an increased
, in other words, a solution to problem (36), for xed q
av
.
Thus, after all, we are interested in individual behavior of agents-bureaucrats
of various types, in response to an increased . In the continuous case cur-
rently being analysed, (36) is equivalent to the following rst-order condition:
@b
@q
(q; ) 
@G

@q
(q; q
av
);
with strict equality for q > 0:
(43)
Let us recall that the rst-order conditions for the initial problem are:
@b
@q
(q; ) 
@'
@q
(q; q
av
);
with strict equality for q > 0:
(44)
The left hand side has not changed since corruption opportunities remained
the same. As for the right hand side, the most convenient way to anal-
yse its behavior is graphically. Let us turn to Figure 13 which illustrates
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Figure 13: The eect of increasing  (the continuous case, 
1
< 
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)
the rst-order conditions. A family of downward slopping curves denote
marginal benets from corruption, for alternative types of agents, , whereas
two upward slopping ones are marginal cost curves, for zero and non-zero
 corresponding to the initial problem and to one of the family problems,
respectively. Assumptions (41) imply that
@G

@q
(q
av
; q
av
) <
@'
@q
(q
av
; q
av
): (45)
We can denitely say that this is the key observation in this paper. Also,
one can easily see that there exists a unique point of intersection of the two
marginal cost curves. Denoting it by q(), we have
@G

@q
(q(); q
av
) =
@'
@q
(q(); q
av
); (46)
and 0 < q() < q
av
. After these preparations, the following assertion becomes
obvious.
23
23
An important task is to study the behavior of q(). Here we omit this subject, for it
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Assertion 3.2 When  goes up:
 agents whose initial choice used to be located to the left of q decrease
their corruption level;
 agents with q

() = 0 choose honest behavior (as before);
 agents whose initial choice was higher than q increase their degree of
involvement in corruption.
24
Formally,
8
<
:
q

() < q =) q(; ; q

av
) < q

()
q

() > q =) q(; ; q

av
) > q

()
: (47)
Intuitively, agents with comparatively good corruption opportunities will
increase their level of involvement in corrupt relations because as  increases,
the burden of punishment mitigates. On the contrary, agents with bad op-
portunities may nd it protable to decrease their level of involvement, for
now they are subject to tighter persecution.
25
Therefore, what one can un-
ambiguously state about the short-run eect is the increased dierentiation
in agents' choices, which is a useful observation.
As for the short-run utility of agents, one can state the following.
is a part of supplementary research concerning the innitesimal analysis and goes beyond
the goals of the current paper.
24
Indeed, assume, for instance, that q

() < q. Then, the RHS of (43) exceeds the LHS
in the point of this agent's initial choice. But, as q increases, the RHS of (43) increases as
well, whereas the LHS decreases. Hence, a new choice is located to the left of the initial
one. The opposite is true when q

() > q.
25
However, note that there always exist two eects of increased involvement in cor-
ruption: the income eect (higher amount of bribes collected), and the punishment eect.
Since these two have opposite directions, the sign of a resulting eect is a priori ambiguous.
43
Assertion 3.3 When  increases innitesimally, the utility of agents whose
initial choice was below the average level of corruption falls, whereas the
utility of other agents rises.
The precise formulation and its correct proof are omitted here, for they
are part of supplementary research mentioned above (devoted to innitesimal
analysis). Intuitively, the direction of a change in the utility of a given agent
coincides for small changes in parameter  with the direction of the change
in the cost function (according to the Envelope Theorem). Therefore, having
properties (35) in mind, agents with q < q
av
will suer from varying the
scheme of punishment; others, on the contrary, will benet.
Up to now, we have investigated the individual behavior of agents quite
thoroughly. But our main question concerns the average level of corruption:
how does it respond to changes in ? As a priori dierent agents respond in
an opposite manner, we cannot predict the behavior of the average level of
corruption unambiguously. Nevertheless, note that q < q
av
, hence, one can
expect that more than half of the agents increase their level of involvement
in corruption. In order to make this statement precise and formal, we should
focus on one of two possible lines of research (resulting in two alternative
formulations of sucient conditions for the average level of corruption to
increase, as a result of an increased , stated below).
Theorem 5 If every agent's initial choice exceeded q  q, that is, if 8 q(; q
av
) 
q, then the average corruption level, q
av
, increases unambiguously as  rises.
Proof. In such a situation, all the agents increase their corruption levels
in the short-run, hence, the 	-curve shifts upwards. As we already know,
this leads to an increased average level of corruption.
Note that this assertion admits a trivial but important consequence: in
the case when all the agents are identical, the average corruption level in-
creases with diminishing external eects arising from implementing a new,
more individualistic, scheme of punishment. Moreover, even if agents dier
from each other, but their actual choices are identical in the initial equilib-
rium, assertion 5 still holds.
The analysis conducted concerns the case of an interior equilibrium only
(i.e., the one with a strictly positive corruption level). As far as the corruption-
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free equilibrium is concerned, we just mention here that it may become un-
stable, as a result of a decentralizing policy. Unfortunately, we have no
opportunity to dwell upon the study of the corruption-free equilibrium in
this paper.
In order to formulate alternative sucient conditions, let us introduce
the notion of an increment choice function. This function shows the absolute
change in the agent's choice, depending on his type. Denote the increment
choice function by 4q(; ). Formally, we have
4q(; ) = q(; ; q

av
)  q

(); (48)
where, as before, q

() stands for the choice of an agent with type , see
section 2.3. Besides, we simplify the formulation of our problem a bit, as-
suming that agents are distributed uniformly over a set of possible types.
26
Now we are ready to specify the conditions sucient for the average level of
corruption to unambiguously increase, with  increased.
Theorem 6 The average level of corruption increases if, rst, function 4q
is convex with respect to , and, second, the median agent's (i.e., the agent
with type 
av
) choice is at least high as q.
For Proof, see Appendix. Also, an alternative formulation of this theo-
rem is discussed there which deals with another way of reparametrizing agents
in a system: according to it, an agent's type is his initial choice, q

(). Such
an interpretation allows for the discarding of the second condition of the
theorem, though at the expence of giving up clear intuition (note, however,
that this second condition is not too binding: once we knew that q < q
av
, we
naturally expect the choice of the medium agent not to fall much shorter of
the average level of corruption).
Convexity-like conditions are quite theoretically convenient. Intuitively,
they seem to reect a big dierentiation in corruption opportunities. Assum-
ing this interpretation to be true, one can conclude that the theorem of an
26
The case of an absolutely continuous distribution of agents could be reduced to the
one considered here automatically: all that changes is the functional form of b(q; ). One
can easily check that under such a reparametrization, the list of requirements (18) remains
the same.
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increased average corruption level holds in two diametrically opposite cases:
the one with almost identical corruption opportunities, and the other with
high dierentiation. Unfortunately, we cannot state this theorem to hold
unconditionally, but counter-examples should look quite odd, so to speak.
Generally, one can expect that, provided the cost function is continuous, the
average level of corruption will increase in response to weakening external
eects.
Let us now turn to the second main case where the cost function has a
jump in zero. We will nd our results need to be corrected substantially.
3.4 Comparative Statics: the case of a jump in zero
Again, before turning to the formal analysis of families of cost functions (35)
exhibiting discontinuity in zero, it is useful to summarize all the assumptions
made about them:
G

(q; q
av
) are well-dened and continuous over (0;+1);
G

(q
av
; q
av
)  '(q
av
; q
av
); 8q
@G

@q
(q; q
av
) decreases with respect to ;
G
0
(q; q
av
)  '(q; q
av
); G
1
(q; q
av
)   (q):
(49)
In contrast with the analysis in the previous section, rst-order condi-
tions (43) no longer characterize the solution correctly. Similary as in sec-
tion 2.3, we introduce double terminology. Namely, let q

av
and

q

() denote
the equilibriumand the agents' choice function in the initial problem, whereas
q

() stands for the solution to rst-order conditions (22), that is, the inter-
mediate choice; Similary, let q(; ; q

av
) denote the parametrized family of
solutions to the rst-order conditions, for alternative  and q
av
= q

av
:
27
@b
@q
(q; ) 
@G

@q
(q; q
av
);
with strict equality for q > 0:
(50)
Finally, q(; ; q

av
) will denote the actual choice of the agent with type , that
is, the solution to problem (36) with q
av
= q

av
(it coincided with q(; ; q

av
),
27
As before, we analyse here a short-run eect, having in mind that it only accumulates,
in the long-run.
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in the continuous case). Also, we will use abbrevated notations q(; ) and
q(; ), respectively.
Let us now turn to the utilities of the agents. In order to analyse it we
again introduce double notations. That is, let us call by the resulting utility
of a given agent his utility when he chooses q(; ; q

av
), instead of q(; ; q

av
):
U(; ) = b(q(; ); ) G

(q(; ); q

av
) G
0
(); (51)
where G
0
() is the value of a jump in zero which, according to our assump-
tions (49), increases in . And we will refer to the result of the actual (full)
maximization (including the question of whether to be involed in corruption
ever) by the actual utility. The latter implies choosing q(; ; q

av
) (let us
denote the actual utility by

U (; )). Formally:

U(; ) = U(; )
+
=

U(; ); if U(; )  0
0; else
: (52)
Also, we will use notations U

() and

U

(), respectively for the resulting
and the actual utilities of an agent with type  in the initial equilibrium.
Firstly, we study the individual behavior of the agents, in response to an
increased . The following assertion is the starting point of our analysis.
Assertion 3.4 When  increases, the intermediate choice of all the agents,
q(; ; q

av
) increases (as long as it was greater than zero; otherwise it could
either increase, or remain to be zero).
The proof almost repeats that of Assertion 3.1, and is omitted here. The
essential thing is that the marginal cost curve monotonically shifts down in
our case, as  increases (see Figure 14). Hence, every agent's choice shifts to
the right.
As for the actual choice function, its formal description is
q(; ; q

av
) =

q(; ; q

av
); if U(; )  0
0; else
: (53)
We saw in section 2.3 that this is equivalent to the following representation
(see Assertion 2.1):
q(; ; q

av
) =
(
q(; ; q

av
); if  

()
0; if  <

()
; (54)
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Figure 14: The eect of an increased  on the intermediate choices of the
agents (the case of a jump in zero)
where

() satises the equation U(;

()) = 0. Therefore, one should
carefully analyse the resulting utility.
Assertion 3.5 The incremental resulting utility of the agents is an increas-
ing function of their type. The resulting utility of the agents, whose choice
falls short of q
av
, decreases monotonically when  increases.
A more careful formalization and proof of Assertion 3.5 are omitted here,
for they are a part of the supplementary research to this paper mentioned
above. As for the cut-o value

(), its behavior is a priory ambiguous. One
can infer from Assertion 3.5 that if q() = q(;

()) < q
av
then

() should
unambiguously increase. In the opposite case, the cut-o value may well
decrease, especially if q() = q(;

()) q
av
, which corresponds to the case
when there is a comparatively small fraction of highly corrupt bureaucrats,
while the others do not take bribes at all. Below we state, without a proof,
the precise result.
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Assertion 3.6 A derivative of

() with respect to  takes the form


0
() =
@G
@
(q()) +
@G
0
@
@b
@
(q())
: (55)
Switching to the main question (that of the dynamics of the average level
of corruption), we recall the denition of the reaction function (42), and
rewrite it, using (54):
	(; q

av
) =
Z
q(; ; q

av
)dF () =
Z


q(; ; q

av
)dF (): (56)
Figures 15 and 16 characterize the cases of increasing and decreasing
cut-o level

(), respectively. Figure 15 suggests the formulation of the
basic theorem proposing sucient conditions for the increase in the average
level of corruption, in response to weakening external eects, in a system
where cost functions of the family have a discontinuity (a jump) in zero.
Simultaneously, we get sucient conditions for the increase of dierentiation
in individual corrupt choices.
Theorem 7 The average level of corruption unambiguously increases if the
cut-o level

() falls with . The dierentiation in individual corruption
levels unambiguously increases in the opposite case (i.e., when the cut-o
level increases with ).
28
The proof is trivial: in the rst case, corruption recruites new agents
while incumbents make corrupt deals more intensively. One can see that the
situation is ambiguous if the condition of this theorem fails to hold. In such
a case, however, dierentiation in the agents' choices increases for sure: less
bureaucrats become involved in corrupt relations, but those who continue to
be involved are doing it more intensively.
At this stage, we end up the analysis of the model constructed, although
many questions remain unanswered which require ongoing research. In the
28
It may well occur that both dierentiation and the average level of corruption rise.
Indeed, we presented only sucient, but not necessary, conditions in this theorem.
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Figure 15: The eect of an increased  on the behavior of the actual agents'
choice function, q(; q

av
). The case of increasing cut-o level

()

b

in
()
q(; q

av
)
initial
q(; ; q

av
)
Figure 16: The eect of an increased  on the behavior of the actual agents'
choice function, q(; q

av
). The case of decreasing cut-o level

()
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next section, I summarize the main conclusions and provide appropriate in-
terpretations in terms of real anti-corruption policy, thus characterizing their
practical value.
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4 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Now it is time to summarize the basic results of the conducted research. In
this paper, the model of corruption in production economies was constructed
which takes into account two kinds of factors of corruption, namely what we
called (following Polterovich (1998)) fundamental and societal ones. Factors
of the rst group are derived from economic and institutional characteristics
of the system under study, while the second-type factors stand for strategic
interaction among agents (here: bureaucrats), in other words, they reect
external eects inherent in such systems. A huge body of published research
on the subject of corruption is devoted to analysing the eects from either
factors of the rst group or of the second one, but not both factors simulta-
neously (see the literature review in the next section). However, factors of
both types are intimately connected with each other, and our model, being a
unifying framework for both types of factors, is an addition to understanding
the nature and essence of corrupt relations (at least, in production processes).
Our assumption that a bureaucrat chooses the degree of involvement in cor-
rupt relations by solving a corresponding optimization problem where costs
from corruption depend not only on his choice but also on the average level
was discussed also in Sah (1991), but from dierent positions (there, crime
rates were focused upon); the simple dilemma to be or not to be a criminal
was posed rst by Becker (1968). Still, almost no research has encorporated,
up to this moment, these external eects into the production environment.
This was the contribution of this paper.
The model was analysed thoroughly. The existence of equilibria was
established, and we found that in a typical situation there is a corruption-
free stable equilibrium and another stable equilibrium with a high level of
corruption. Focusing our attention on the latter, we revealed the so-called
accumulation eect: long-run shifts in the average level of corruption, in
response to changes in various parameters, multiply shifts in the short-run
perspective.
In addition, agents' individual choices were characterized. It turned out
that the function specifying agents' choices is continuous when the cost func-
tion is continuous over the closed interval [0;+1), and reveals a stepwise
behavior if the cost function has a jump in zero.
The main goal, however, was to compare alternative schemes of punish-
ment in the framework of the model constructed. Restricted to a xed bud-
get, one is still free to choose one or another pattern of corruption deterrence.
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A xed budget requirement was interpreted in terms of our model's parame-
ters, though not precisely. A focal (imaginary) scheme was postulated as the
one where external eects are ignored by the policymaker when considering
how to allocate the resources at hand, and the main question was whether
the policymaker should try to approximate such a scheme (some publications
refer to externalities as a driving force for corruption; see, e.g., Polterovich
(1998)). There is no exact answer. Nevertheless, denite features were es-
tablished. We recall some of them here, trying not to use mathematical but
policymaker's language.
When it is felt that there are no xed costs from corrupt activity so that
almost honest behavior generates almost no costs, the policymaker is faced
with the problem that accounting for externalities in a lesser degree leads
to higher dierentiation in agents' choices. Moreover, such a bias results in
favoring more corrupt agents while threatening moderate ones. As for the
average level of corruption, it probably only increases. Thus, one is suggested
to move in the opposite direction exploring external eects in order to get a
higher degree of uniformity in dierent agents' choices.
If, on the contrary, a xed cost part is expected to arise, the policymaker,
while weakening his reference to the average level of corruption, confronts
higher bribes and a higher degree of illegal activity from those who decide to
be corrupt as before. If, in addition, new agents enter the pool of corruption-
eers, the policymaker will denitely get a higher average level of corruption.
In case when many agents refrain from corruption as a result of such a pol-
icy, the average level may decrease, but in this case dierentiation increases
substantially.
Thus, choosing the specic form of a punishment scheme requires taking
all these circumstances into account, while analysing the situation at hand.
All that was established in this paper may help the policymaker to form his
position towards ghting the corruption taking place under his jurisdiction.
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A review of literature
and the place of our research
The substantial analysis in the current paper is based on the classication
of factors of corruption which was is adopted from Polterovich (1998). It
was emphasized that it is the simultaneous work of both types of factors
that determine the nature of corrupt relations in production. And we noted
that except for Acemoglu, Verdier (1997), most of the papers devoted to
corruption elaborate on just one type of factor. Nevertheless, many insights
were rst gained from these investigations, and it is high time to pay for these
ideas, with special attention to research on corruption and similar topics. It
is convenient to divide a whole amount of research into three main groupes.
Class A. Rent-seeking and corruption: accounting for funda-
mental factors
The rst to systematically study corruption from positions of fundamen-
tal and organizational factors was Rose-Ackerman (1975). Actually, these
workings contain the rst attempt to model a market for corruption ser-
vices precisely, though in a quite general form. Moral factors and the factor
of possible punishment are taken into account. A zone of feasible bribes
is characterized, and a proper mechanism of making corrupt decisions by
a bureaucrat is revealed. Organizational factors are also accounted for, in
the form of a specic hierarchical structure of dierent bureaucrats in the
system and how this structure aects the level of corruption activity. It
is shown that under some circumstances, corruption is not dangerous since
one expects it not to be realized in practice, while under other conditions it
could become a widespread phenomenon. Alternative anti-corruption mea-
sures are analysed in the paper. What makes the paper highly relevant for
our approach is that it is also based on corruption relations in the produc-
tion process, namely, rms are competing for a Government project to fulll.
In the book by Rose-Ackerman (1978), the material is systemized, dierent
forms of corruption are classied and subjected to a detailed analysis.
Another seminal paper providing a comparative analysis of alternative
anti-corruption measures accounting for industrial organization of corrupt re-
lations is by Shleifer, Vishny (1993). In contrast with our research, a red tape
phenomenon is considered when bribes are being extorted for the fulllment
of bureaucrats' direct obligations. Ignoring the possibility of punishment,
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the authors characterize three dierent forms of bureaucratic structure and
stretch them in a strict line with respect to social harm: the best structure
for the society is when bureaucrats are competing for clients; the second-best
is the unique (monopolistic) bribes collection, like the Maa or the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union; the worst is when bribes are being extorted
independently and chaotically by dierent bureaucratic branches (for exam-
ple, post-soviet Russia, at least during 1992-1996). Besides, negative conse-
quences of the necessary secrecy of markets for corrupt services are discussed,
as well as the cathastrophic consequences for research and development.
Guriev (1998) conducted an interesting research on the importance of the
hierarchical bureaucratic structure in determining bribe levels and the scale
of red tape phenomenon.
In the current paper, the focus is made on the corruption phenomenon,
while other kinds of a deviating behavior deserve careful study. Two years
ago, we (together with Prof. Polishchuk) analysed sociological aspects of
rent-seeking phenomenon. A paper by Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997)
somehow inspired the current research, being to a certain degree consistent
with its methodology (see also Savvateev (1997)). We studied a generalised
version of rent-seeking, following the ideology of the seminal works of Tullock
(1980) and Skaperdas (1996). It was assumed that there are two kinds of ac-
tivities accessible for agents in an economy: production and redistribution. It
is a common knowledge that a xed share of what is being produced in a sys-
tem is subject to redistribution. The production function was of the simpliest
possible (one-factor, called a resource,) type and we assumed that the same
resource is being used in redistribution. Production function is characterized
by decreasing returns while the redistribution sector reveals constant returns
to scale. A corresponding coecient is determined so that the market for
expropriation clears. Of course, a simple banning of redistribution is socially
desirable since it enriches the economy as a whole (all the resources are then
used in production and are not wasted away in redistribution activity), but
it turns out that provided some conditions hold a part of agents (moreover,
more than a half of agents) may not favor such a reform, for it decreases
their individual welfare. Glaser (1993) also demonstrates (though within an
entirelly dierent approach) how a candidate whose program promises not
to decrease the amount of rents in the economy could well be elected. As a
result, the reform is blocked or postponed. We also stated and proved con-
ditions under which the reform, on the contrary, is a Pareto-improvement.
Putting it briey, these conditions require that returns to scale in production
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are not decreasing too sharply.
Polterovich (1998) used a similar model to analyse corruption equilib-
ria, with respect to their stability and social eciency. It turns out that
sometimes producers vote for corruption: it helps them to get rid of an inef-
cient tax burden. A striking result is that under some circumstances a vast
majority of producers would prefer to deal with moderately corrupt ocials.
Ericson (1983) analyses the soviet shadow economy and comes to the
conclusion that its presence sometimes guarantees a Pareto-improvement over
an imaginary entirely planned regime. In fact, bribes clear the market, and
this motivation is quite popular for overcontrolled economic organizations.
B. Corruption: A Societal Approach
During the last decade, an approach to explaining corruption by societal
factors has been quite popular, i.e., that the main source of stability and per-
vasive expansion of corruption could be found in stable patterns of behavior,
properly examined over decades or even centuries and seen in the nature of
interconnections and positive external eects prevailing in the corrupt en-
vironment. We already cited Polterovich (1998) which in fact is a starting
point for our research. The main conclusion of the author was that a switch
from bad to good equilibriummay be the result of implementing a short-run
but extremely tough anti-corruption policy.
Lui (1986) comes to similar conclusions in a framework of the overlapping
generations model. Tirole (1996) is even more pessimistic. He analysed cor-
ruption from collective reputation positions when two types of agents interact
in the economy, and all the agents of the rst type are partially identied
with each other, from the point of view of the agents of the second type. The
author emphasizes the importance of personal gains from deviating behavior
in forming a stable long-run corruption equilibrium, despite the fact that
collective reputation matters. Based on a very clear and intuitive model, he
shows that sometimes an instant stimulus to be dishonest could fully deter-
mine the ongoing story, generating a stable corrupt pattern of behavior. Alas,
even a very tough anti-corruption policy implemented during a short period
of time may not bring a change in this socially harmful behavioral pattern.
After relaxing penalties, corruption would return again to the system. As a
matter of fact, it could be quite inertial phenomena.
On the contrary, Biccieri and Rovelli (1995) demonstrated how, under
certain conditions, a stable corruption equilibrium may suddenly loose its
stability and eventually be replaced by a corruption-free one, provided there
56
is a certain fraction of agents who never take bribes.
Finally, a paper by Acemoglu and Verdier (1997) deserves special atten-
tion since this is the only one to take both factors of corruption into account.
Authors model an economy with two dierent productions: the rst one is
with good technology (for it produces positive externalities), and the other
one is with bad. In a competitive equilibrium, all producers choose bad
technology (for reasons similar to those resulting in the famous Prisoner's
Dilemma). In order to correct the situation, the government hires a cer-
tain amount of bureaucrats whose direct obligation is to check whether rms
choose good technology. However, they have stimula to collect bribes instead
in exchange for delivering wrong information to the government concerning a
technology actually chosen. Numerical externalities are taken explicitly into
account while modelling the monitoring process | the more deviating rms,
the less probably a given deviator will be caught. Assuming heterogenuity
of bureaucrats, it is proved that even the optimal organization suggests an
excessively large sta of ocials, excessively high salaries for bureaucrats in
the public sector, and a certain positive level of corruption.
C. Crime, punishment and tax evasion
Another line of research intimately connected to ours is devoted to the
general crime and punishment problem or to (probably) its most popular
special case, i.e., tax evasion. Models of this sort also focus attention on the
problem of choosing the optimal scheme of punishment which either prevents
criminal behavior or equates marginal (social) costs with marginal costs of
ghting it, i.e., the problem of choosing and enforcing the optimal level of
criminal behavior of a given kind. A seminal work on these issues is by
Becker (1968). A somewhat dierent view is enlighten in Sah (1991), and
we based our analysis here substantially on his ideas. Out of a huge body
of tax evasion literature, let us mention Vasin and Panova (2000), and also
Chander and Wilde (1992) and Sanchez and Sobel (1993).
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Appendix. Proofs of the main theorems
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let us write down the Lagrangian for problem (5):
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
j
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Recalling that b
ij
is convex, one can conclude that the rst-order condi-
tions are necessary and sucient for this problem:
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Actually it means that either  = 0 or for all positive q
ij
b
0
ij
(q
ij
)  ; (59)
whereas for all other indices j b
0
ij
(0) < .
In the rst case we have 8j b
0
ij
(q
ij
) = 0, that is all the choices q
ij
are
satiation points for corresponding functions b
ij
. Such a situation could be an
equilibrium only if the value of q
i
chosen by a bureaucrat is excessively high:
q
i

P
j
q
ij
, for all feasible levels of illegal activities.
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In the second case, for suciently small values of  we have
P
j
q
ij
() > q
i
.
Our task is to nd such  that
P
j
q
ij
() = q
i
, where q
ij
() denotes a solution
to (59) or zero. It is easy to check that functions q
ij
() are continuous and
nonincreasing (this is again due to properties of functions b
ij
, see (18), hence,
their sum as well is continuous and monotonic. For  > max
j
(b
0
ij
(0)) this sum
becomes zero. Therefore, there exist a unique  satisfying conditions (58),
hence, being (together with q
ij
()) a solution to problem (5).
The intuition of what is going on is straightforward. Here  represents
nothing else but a shadow price of illegal services for a bureaucrat. In the
equilibrium, price is determined in a manner that guarantees the equality
of the overall amount of illegal services supplied by this bureaucrat to the
29
It is clear from the equilibrium analysis of the basic model of interacting bureaucrats
that this case never happens: no one bureaucrat would choose such q
i
unless the costs
from corruption are independent of his choice.
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initially chosen value of q
i
. In this way, producers who are not rich enough
to support price  will be ignored by the bureaucrat, i.e., their q
ij
= 0.
From now on, (q
i
) denotes a shadow price of a service, q
ij
(q
i
) stands for
amounts of illegal services to producers, and the set of all j for which q
ij
6= 0
is denoted by J . In addition, let us exclude from consideration the trivial
and irrelevant case of  = 0.
We now turn to the study of function b
i
(q
i
) =
P
j2J
b
ij
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ij
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i
)). Dierenti-
ating with respect to q
i
one gets
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using the rst-order conditions. Therefore, rst of all, b
0
i
(q
i
) > 0, and second,
b
0
i
(0) = max
j
(b
0
ij
(0)) since one can easily check that when q
i
! 0, we have
! max
j
(b
0
ij
(0)).
The next step is the behavior of the second derivative, b
00
i
(q
i
). Due to (60),
one has b
00
i
(q
i
) = 
0
(q
i
), whereas the latter could be found by dierentiating
the following equality with respect to q
i
:
X
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i
: (61)
Taking derivatives, we get
1  (
X
j
q
0
ij
())  
0
(q
i
): (62)
Since derivatives of q
ij
() are nonpositive, so is the derivative of their sum.
Hence, 
0
(q
i
)  0. As a result, the concavity of the function b
i
(q
i
) should
hold.
The boundedness of function b
i
follows from the boundedness of functions
b
ij
. The proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
A verbal (intuitive) description is given below. Function b
i
(q
i
) starts from
zero with a speed equal to the maximum of the derivatives of functions b
ij
at
zero-point, actually coinciding with the function on which this maximum is
reached. As q
i
increases, a sum determining b
i
\absorbs" new items which re-
ects the involvement of new producers (with lower production capacities) in
a group illegally supplied by the bureaucrat. Eventually, satiation is reached,
due to the boundedness of the overall monetary stock of all the producers.
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Proof of Theorem 6.
The proof is based on Jensen's Inequality which is written below (for
convex functions).
Jensen's Inequality. Let f be a convex function. Then, for an arbitrary
chosen integrating set A, one has
Z
A
f()d  f
0
@
Z
A
d
1
A
: (63)
Now we can write, using (42), (48), (63), (23), and the second condition
of the theorem, the following chain of equalities and inequalities:
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(64)
The proof is complete.
The importance of theorem 6 consists in the fact that its conditions are
expressed in terms of the model's data, not in terms of a specic equilibrium
chosen. It is done at the expense of making an additional assumption con-
cerning the medium agent's initial choice. Below we demonstrate how one
can exchange this additional assumption for giving up invariant terms.
We had proved earlier (see (28)) that the agents' choice function is non-
decreasing. In the regular case, one can make a monotonic reparametrization
such that a new parameter would be the agent's choice q

() in the initial
equilibrium. Then, rst, dierent equilibria generate dierent reparametriza-
tions, and second, the distribution's density of the agents with respect to their
types, f() = F
0
(), would turn out not to be uniform (and also will depend
on a specic equilibrium choice). However, if we managed to establish the
concavity of the increment choice function as a function of q

with respect
to the corresponding densityF
0
(q

),
30
we could be condent that Theorem 6
continues to hold since its fulllment is again based on Jensen's Inequality.
Summing up, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 If the increment choice function 4q(; q

) is convex in q

with
respect to the density of the distribution of agents over their q

-types, F
0
(q

),
then the average level of corruption increases with parameter .
30
We omit here all the pecularities of the formal denition of this notion. We simply
skip its denition, instead accounting entirely on intuitive understanding.
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